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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research on the role of board of directors as a key corporate governance mechanism has 
attracted the attention of scholars and practitioners in recent years. The recent global 
financial crisis has reactivated the debate about the effectiveness of the board of directors as 
a safeguard for the interests of shareholders. However, despite the relevance of the concept 
‘board effectiveness’ in the current context its meaning is unclear in corporate governance 
literature (Petrovic, 2008). In this study, following among others Payne et al. (2009) and 
Petrovic (2008), board effectiveness is defined as the ability of the board to fulfil and 
perform its roles effectively. 
Two basic roles for the board of directors are generally accepted in the literature (Linck et 
al., 2008; Pathan and Skully, 2010): a strategic role and a monitoring role. The strategic 
board role is associated with the active participation of directors in the formulation of 
corporate strategy (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). This role is related to corporate 
performance and risk-taking, since the board of directors should help to develop a corporate 
strategy that maximises the economic value of the firm (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Payne, et al., 2009), while considering various risk factors and avoiding excessive risks 
(OECD, 2009; Pathan, 2009). The monitoring role of the board means controlling 
managerial decisions and limiting undesirable managerial behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 
1983), thereby ensuring that the business is run in the best interests of shareholders. 
Another current question concerning the board of directors is to determine the factors that 
can affect board effectiveness (Minichilli, et al., 2009; Payne, et al., 2009; Petrovic, 2008). 
Empirical studies have focused on examining the impact of board structure and 
composition on a proxy of board effectiveness, namely, corporate performance (Dalton et al. 
1998; Dalton et al., 1999, De Andres et al. 2005; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). There is 
also a recent stream of literature that emphasises social and psychological factors as key 
attributes of board effectiveness, such as the background diversity, cognitive conflicts and 
skill of directors (Minichilli et al., 2009; Minichilli et al., 2011; Payne et al. 2009; Roberts 
et al. 2005).  
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Following the traditional approach, this study is focused on several board characteristics as 
factors that can affect the effectiveness of a board: composition, size, and activity. The first 
reason for using these variables is related to their direct link with the main 
recommendations for boards in the international codes of good corporate governance and 
regulations (Dey, 2010). As Roberts et al. (2005) highlight, these standards are expected to 
lend legitimacy to corporations. The second reason is that these variables are directly 
observable and homogenously measured across different companies, and so it is a simple 
task to make comparisons and extract results.  
Despite a substantial body of empirical research regarding the relationship between board 
characteristics and effectiveness, the results to date are inconclusive. Some authors 
(Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Hillman et al., 2009) explain these inconclusive results due to 
the one-dimensional perspective theoretically adopted by this research, which overlooks the 
contextual factors affecting the behaviour of the board of directors and their causes. 
According to Haspeslagh (2010) the most important current external factor that can affect 
board behaviour is the turbulent economic environment due to the global financial crisis.  
This paper specifically investigates aspects of corporate governance linked to board 
weaknesses of the recent global financial crisis that could affect board behaviour. The idea 
that changes in macroeconomic context may affect the nature and value of contributions 
made by boards of directors to corporate results has motivated our research question: has 
the most recent global financial crisis caused changes in the influence of board structure 
characteristics in corporate results, in terms of corporate performance, corporate risk-taking 
and earnings management?  
The paper is expected to contribute to the theoretical and empirical understanding of 
corporate governance related to the recent global financial crisis and board behaviour. 
Another novelty of this paper is related to the introduction in the analysis of the corporate 
risk-taking variable, since the great majority of previous empirical papers in this field have 
focused on corporate performance without introducing risk variables. In terms of 
methodology, our use of a longitudinal panel study – S&P 500 index listed firms over the 
period 2002-2008 – improves previous research results based on cross-sectional studies. In 
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addition, the applied two-step GMM estimator system addresses the potential unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity.  
This paper is divided into six sections. After this introduction, a review of the theoretical 
framework is provided. The third section includes information on the sample, variables, and 
methodology used in estimating the model. The fourth section presents the findings and 
empirical analysis. Theoretical and practical implications, as well as limitations and future 
research are presented in the fifth section. The final section summarises and concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Previous studies have traditionally adopted the agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, several authors (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Filatotchev et al., 2008) have remarked on the inability of this theory to explain the context 
dependence of board of directors and its underlying decision-making responsibility. For 
this reason, a growing number of studies suggest that the agency framework should be used 
in conjunction with complementary theories (Daily et al., 2003; Filatotchev and Brian, 
2009; Huse, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005), such as stewardship (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991) and resource dependence theories (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) highlight that agency theory and stewardship theory may be 
valid for some phenomena but invalid for others. Lynall et al. (2003) suggest that it is not 
necessary to choose one theoretical framework over another, but rather, identify under 
which conditions each theoretical view is most applicable. The resource dependence theory 
can help to introduce an important debate about the relationship between environmental and 
board characteristics, since board changes reflect new environmental needs (Hillman et al., 
2000; Hillman et al., 2009). 
The research question in this paper is to analyse the changes due to the most recent global 
financial crisis on the influence of board characteristics on corporate results, in terms of 
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corporate performance, corporate risk-taking, and earnings management. To empirically 
test this question, nine hypotheses, presented in relative terms, have been developed on the 
effect of board characteristics for each corporate result. The resource dependence theory 
enables the effect of external economic environments on these basic board roles to be taken 
into account. Thus, the changes in the relationships among different economic contexts are 
predicted according to the applicability of the resource dependence theory.  
 
2.1. STRATEGIC BOARD ROLE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND 
CORPORATE RISK-TAKING 
The relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance or corporate risk-
taking has been widely examined in the corporate governance literature (Bargeron et al. 
2010; Cheng, 2008; Dalton et al., 1998; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 
2009; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Pathan, 2009; Petrovic, 2008; Vafeas, 1999).  
Based on the strategic board role, Miller-Millesen (2003) argues that when the environment 
is stable and the corporation is not responding to a crisis the need for external information 
should be lower than in an unstable environment. Consequently, in unstable environments, 
resource dependence theory becomes more relevant than in stable environments, since the 
board is viewed as a body that links the corporation with its environment and resource 
dependence theory could help explain how corporations reduce uncertainties (Hillman et al., 
2009). 
Focusing on corporate composition, the resource dependence theory suggests that outside 
directors who are prestigious in their professions and communities can be providers of 
timely information for executives. Muth and Donaldson (1998) suggest that outside 
directors can be used to manage environmental contingencies. Consistent with this 
argument, Daily (1996) finds evidence that firms with a higher proportion of outside 
directors are more likely to successfully emerge from difficult situations. 
Therefore, the following theoretical hypotheses are proposed: 
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 Hypothesis 1a: In a recession period (unstable environment), a higher percentage of 
outside directors leads to a higher level of performance, as compared with an 
expansion period (stable environment). 
 Hypothesis 1b: In a recession period (unstable environment), a higher percentage of 
outside directors leads to lower levels of risk-taking, as compared with an expansion 
period (stable environment). 
The number of directors is another factor that can affect the behaviour of a board (Dalton et 
al., 1999; Cheng, 2008). The resource dependence theory argues that larger boards bring 
greater opportunity for more links to the external environment, especially in unstable 
economic periods, and hence access to resources that may improve corporate performance 
and reduce uncertainty (Korac-Kakabadse et al., 2001; Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Provan, 1980; 
Siciliano, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
Consequently, the following hypotheses are presented: 
 Hypothesis 2a: In a recession period (unstable environment), a larger board leads to a 
higher level of performance, as compared with an expansion period (stable 
environment). 
 Hypothesis 2b: In a recession period (unstable environment), a larger board leads to a 
lower level of corporate risk-taking, as compared with an expansion period (stable 
environment). 
A significant number of studies (Jackling and Johl, 2009; Vafeas, 1999; Xie et al. 2003) use 
the frequency of board meeting as a measure of board activity, since it is closely related to 
the efforts made by directors to improve the management of the firm. Theoretically, board 
meetings may be an important resource to link the external environment with the 
governance of the company, and therefore the frequency of board meetings may improve 
corporate performance (Jackling and Johl, 2009) and help control risky decisions, manage 
external contingencies, and seize available opportunities. Jensen (1993) also suggests that 
boards seem to be relatively inactive in stable environments and remark that boards 
increase their activity in order to symbolise a response to poor performance. 
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Thus, the following hypotheses are expected: 
 Hypothesis 3a: In a recession period (unstable environment), a higher frequency of 
board meetings leads to higher levels of performance, as compared with an expansion 
period (stable environment). 
 Hypothesis 3b: In a recession period (unstable environment), a higher frequency of 
board meetings leads to a lower level of corporate risk-taking, as compared with an 
expansion period (stable environment). 
 
2.2. MONITORING BOARD ROLE: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Numerous studies have analysed, from theoretical and empirical perspectives, the 
relationship between board characteristics and earnings management (Beasley, 1996; 
Bugshan, 2005; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Klein, 2002; Xie et al. 2003).  
There are not current developments in resource dependence theory that can support the 
existence of changes due to macroeconomic variables – such as the recent economic 
recession – on the influence of board characteristics on earnings management. Dechow, Ge, 
and Schrand (2010) remark that they only found a paper (Liu and Ryan, 2006) that 
primarily examines macroeconomic factors (e.g. business cycle) as a determinant of 
earnings quality. Liu and Ryan (2006) only focus on the banking industry and remark that 
the asymmetry detected in their results may be firm-specific or industry-level rather than a 
macroeconomic phenomenon. Dechow, et al. (2010) do not find any studies that 
hypothesise macroeconomic conditions as a determinant for earnings quality and suggest 
this topic as an opportunity for future research.  
To our knowledge, there are no empirical papers that test the relationship between board 
characteristics and earnings management at a multi-industry level and under different 
macroeconomic conditions. Consequently, the following hypotheses are developed in the 
context of the inexistence of theoretical or empirical results that support differences in the 
relationship between the board characteristics and earnings management under various 
economic contexts: 
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 Hypothesis 1c: In a recession period (unstable environment), there are no differences 
in the impact of the percentage of outside directors on earnings management as 
compared with an expansion period (stable environment). 
 Hypothesis 2c: In a recession period (unstable environment), there are no differences 
in the impact of board size on earnings management as compared with an expansion 
period (stable environment). 
 Hypothesis 3c: In a recession period (unstable environment), there are no differences 
in the impact of the frequency of meetings on earnings management as compared with 
an expansion period (stable environment). 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. SAMPLE 
The main objective of this study is to examine the changes in the impact of board 
characteristics on corporate variables due to the most recent global financial crisis. As a 
consequence of it was the most recent recession period. Therefore, to analyse these changes 
the sample period spans from 2002 to 2008, taking into account the most recent periods of 
growth and recession according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
Therefore, the sample period from 2002 to 2007 corresponds with the most recent 
expansion business cycle and 2008 with the most recent contraction cycle. 
The sample contains firms listed in Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500) during the 
period 2002-2008. This index represents a high percentage of all U.S. publicly traded 
companies and it is usually considered the benchmark for U.S. equity performance (Rai and 
Bhanumurthy, 2004). In addition, all the firms examined are affected by the same external 
corporate governance mechanisms such as legislation or historical and cultural factors, 
making them homogeneous in terms of the corporate governance environment. 
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Financial, accounting, and ownership data has been extracted from the Thompson One 
Banker database. The board characteristics have been obtained through the annual Spencer 
Stuart Board Index. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 3448 firm-year observations. 
Nonetheless, the information of board characteristics is fully available only for 2651 firm-
year observations, thus, it considerably reduces the final sample. With the aim of applying 
the system-GMM methodology, a balanced panel is required in the estimations, which 
differs depending on the available number of observations that fulfil all the variables used 
in each model.  
 
3.2. VARIABLES 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Insert table 1 about here 
 Dependent variables 
This study is focused on three key corporate variables: namely, corporate performance, 
corporate risk-taking, and earnings management.  
Following Cornett et al. (2009), Muth and Donaldson (1998), and Jackling and Johl (2009), 
this paper uses an accounting performance measurement as a proxy for the performance 
variable (PERFORMANCE), specifically, earnings before extraordinary items and after 
taxes to total assets (EBEIAT), since this ratio reflects corporate performance more 
faithfully than measurements based on market data. In this regard, several authors (Bhagat 
and Bolton, 2008; Conett et al. 2009) argue that this accounting measurement is more 
focused on current performance and is not susceptible to investor anticipation since the 
EBEIAT is not tied to share prices. 
Despite using an accounting measurement for corporate performance in this study, the 
levels of risk measured by accounting measurements could be biased by earnings 
smoothing, since low earnings volatility may indicate active earnings smoothing rather than 
low real volatility (John et al., 2008). Thus, according to Bergeron et al. (2010), Anderson 
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and Fraser (2000), Pathan (2009), and Leaven and Levine (2009) corporate risk-taking 
(RISK) is measured as the standard deviation of share returns. As Pathan (2009) remarks, 
this measurement captures the overall variability in firm share returns and reflects the 
market’s perceptions about the risks inherent in a firm’s assets, liabilities, and off-balance-
sheet positions, and this is the risk that managers usually monitor. 
With respect to earnings management, there are several ways to calculate a proxy of 
managerial opportunism; however, the modified version of the Jones model proposed by 
Dechow et al. (1995) has been widely used in the literature (Bartov et al., 2001; Cornett et 
al., 2008). Following Cornett, et al. (2008) and Klein (2002), in this study earnings 
management (EARNINGS MANAGEMENT) has been approximated by the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals using a modified Jones model. 
 Independent variables 
Regarding board characteristics, the study focuses on the following: board composition, 
board size, and board activity.  
According to De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Jackling and Johl (2009), board 
composition is measured using the proxy percentage of outside directors (OUTSIDER) 
which is defined as the number of non-executive directors over the total number of board 
members.  
Following De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Muth and Donaldson (1998) the number of 
board members is used as a measurement for board size (BOARD SIZE).  
Consistent with Vafeas (1999), Xie et al. (2003) and Jackling and Johl (2009), the 
frequency of board meetings is the proxy of board activity (BOARD MEETINGS), which 
is measured through the number of meetings held annually by the board of directors.  
In addition, we include the interaction variables between the board characteristics and crisis 
(OUTSIDER*CRISIS, BOARD SIZE*CRISIS, and BOARD MEETINGS*CRISIS), where 
CRISIS is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the year falls in the recession 
period. As Aguinis and Gottfredson (2010) argue, the interaction effects state the direction 
or strength of the relationship depends upon other factors.  Thus, using interaction effects, 
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this research tests whether there are differences in the effects of board characteristics on 
corporate variables due to the recent global financial crisis. 
 Control variables 
In this study, following previous empirical research (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Bargeron et 
al., 2010; Cornett et al., 2009; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Hu and Izumida, 2008; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Pathan, 2009 ), the firm specific variables that could affect the 
three dependent variables are: the firm’s market-to-book ratio that is given as a proxy for 
growth opportunities (GROWTH); total debt per unit of total assets as a proxy for capital 
structure (LEVERAGE) the natural log of total assets as an indicator for size (SIZE); a 
dummy variable as a proxy for chair duality that equals one if the chairman of the board of 
directors is also an executive officer (CHAIR DUALITY); and the total number of 
individuals, companies, and banks that own at least five percent of the company’s shares 
are given as a measurement for ownership (OWNERSHIP). Moreover, dummy variables 
are considered to reflect differences between years (YEAR).  
Additionally, the corporate performance equation (1) includes the ratio of sales to total 
assets as a measurement of a firm’s business (SALES) (De Andres, Azofra and Lopez, 
2005; Tribo et al., 2007); in the corporate risk-taking equation (2) the volume of shares 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding is used as an indicator for the frequency 
of trading (FREQUENCY TRADING) (Pathan, 2009); and in the earnings management 
equation (3) the cash earnings net of capital expenditure and total dividends paid to total 
assets is used as a proxy of free cash flow (FREE CASH FLOW) (Chung et al., 2005; Gul 
and Tsui, 2001).  
Furthermore, the dependent variable is lagged one period to prevent potential endogeneity 
problems (Tribo et al. 2007; Deutsch et al. 2010), and given that dependent variables 
feature high levels of interrelationships, controls are made for this effect. Previous literature 
has been considered to control these possible effects. Scholars from a variety of disciplines 
have explored the relationship between performance and risk (Bowman, 1980; Fama and 
French, 1992; Sharpe, 1964), and earnings management and corporate performance 
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(Cornett et al, 2009; Gul and Tsui, 2001), thus, these relationship are considered in 
equations (1), (2), and (3).  
 
3.3. EMPIRICAL MODELS  
The main specification is aimed to test changes in the effect of board characteristics on 
corporate variables due to the global financial crisis.  
The first equation contains performance as the dependent variable. Previous studies show 
that board characteristics may affect corporate performance (Cornett et al. 2009; De Andres 
et al., 2005; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Vafeas, 1999). 
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The second equation corresponds to the regression of corporate risk-taking. Pathan (2009) 
establishes a relationship between strong boards (i.e. small board size and more outside 
directors) and corporate risk-taking. Bargeron et al. (2010) examines the effect of outsiders 
on corporate risk-taking after SOX. Deutsch et al. (2010) consider that outside directors can 
affect corporate risk-taking. Although, to our knowledge, there are no empirical papers that 
directly include board activity in the equation of corporate risk-taking. In this work, board 
activity is considered as another variable that may determine board effectiveness and, 
therefore, it may also affect corporate risk-taking. 
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The third equation is conducted on the determinants of earnings management. Following 
Cornett et al. (2008), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Xie et al. (2003), it is expected 
that board composition, board size, and board activity are related to the monitoring board 
role.  
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Estimation method 
Given the feature of the data (cross-sectional and time-series data) we use the panel data 
methodology. In this case, we have to consider the existence of latent unobservable effects 
specific to each firm (ηi). Previous studies (Cornett et al. 2009; De Andres and Vallelado, 
2008; Pathan, 2009; Pathan and Skully, 2010) argue that variables used in this research 
present endogeneity problems. Wooldridge (2002) suggests that the general approach for 
estimating models that present problems of endogeneity is the use of instruments. In this 
regard, an instrumental variable approach is applied to address the endogenity problem; in 
particular, the system-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator has been implemented using a two-step 
methodology, since the estimates are efficient and asymptotically robust in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. The standard second-stage error correction proposed by Windmeijer 
(2005) is also applied. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 present regression results for corporate performance (equation 1), 
corporate risk-taking (equation 2) and earnings management (equation 3) as a function of 
board characteristics and other control variables. Column (a) of Tables 2, 3, and 4 presents 
(3) 
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the results without including the interaction variable between board characteristics and 
crisis. The effect of this interaction variable is presented in column (e).  
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Insert table 3 about here 
 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
4.1. STRATEGIC BOARD ROLE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND 
CORPORATE RISK-TAKING. 
Focusing on the effect of outside directors on board behaviour, the results indicate that 
higher proportions of outside directors on boards lead to lower levels of corporate 
performance (β3 = -0.07, p < 0.05; in equation 1), however, this effect does not change 
during the recession period, since the coefficient of interaction variable is not statistically 
significant. This finding does not support hypothesis 1a presented in the theoretical 
framework, which predicted a greater involvement in strategic decisions by outsiders 
during stressful economic conditions. 
With regards to the second hypothesis 1b related to corporate risk-taking, we observe that 
changes in the effect on risk of the percentage of outside directors depends on the economic 
context. The coefficient of outside directors is positive and statistically significant for the 
full sample period (β3 = 1.84, p < 0.05; in equation 2), however, although the results are 
slightly weak (β4 = -2.60, p < 0.10; in equation 2) when we consider an unstable 
environment, this result is important as it could support hypothesis 1b (a higher percentage 
of outside directors leads to lower levels of corporate risk-taking as compared with an 
expansion period). One reason behind this result may be that in a recession, outside 
directors can be providers of timely information that helps executives be more sensitive to 
regulatory compliance and so avoid any default by being more conservative and prudent. 
 15 
The results show that the number of directors on a board does not affect corporate 
performance during the economic growth period. However, supporting hypothesis 2a, 
board size becomes an important factor affecting corporate performance in a recession (β6 = 
0.01, p < 0.01; in Equation 1). In this regard, the members of large boards make a 
considerable effort to solve the economic problems of a firm in order to keep their posts 
and reputations. Aligned with our multitheoretic approach, in a recession period, resource 
dependence theory suggests that larger boards have more human capital to advise 
managers, leading to higher levels of corporate performance.  
Regarding risk, we do not find evidence supporting hypothesis 2b about the relationship 
between board size and corporate risk-taking when comparing both periods. Therefore, our 
data does not support the theoretical assumption that larger boards make more effort to 
reach consensus and reduce uncertainty in a recession period, since larger boards bring 
greater opportunity for more links to the external environment. 
The results show important differences in the effectiveness of board meetings depending on 
the economic environment. We observe that the frequency of meetings negatively impacts 
on corporate performance during the expansion period (β7 = -0.002, p < 0.01; in equation 1). 
However, the sign of the relationship is reversed during the recession (β8 = 0.002, p < 0.05; 
in equation 1). Therefore, a clear change is observed between periods as predicted in 
hypothesis 3a. This result is consistent with Jensen (1993) and Vafeas (1999), who argue 
that boards operate routinely and do little to discuss and establish an effective strategic 
management during periods of economic growth, while generating costs for the firm in 
terms of director meeting fees and travel expenses. In contrast, when performance declines, 
board meetings are more active and effective in facing corporate economic problems.  
When focusing on hypothesis 3b, we find that the frequency of board meetings positively 
impacts on corporate risk-taking and, therefore the hypothesis is not supported; however, 
this relationship is only statistically significant during the recession (β7 = 0.15, p < 0.01; in 
equation 2). One of the possible reasons behind this result could be that board meetings 
during a recession are more active with the aim of improving performance. Thus, during 
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these meetings the directors make important decisions that involve changes in the strategy 
of the firm in order to find new procedures and markets to improve performance.  
 
4.2. MONITORING BOARD ROLE: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT. 
The results support hypothesis 1c, since it is found evidence of not significant change due 
to the global financial crisis in the influence that higher proportions of outside directors 
have on earnings management. Higher proportions of outside directors improve the 
objective judgement of the board and negatively impact on managerial opportunism, 
although this relationship is weakly supported (β3 = -0.06, p < 0.10; in equation 3).  
To examine the eighth hypothesis (Hypotesis 2c), the relationship between board size and 
earnings management has been analysed. There is no evidence to support this hypothesis, 
since in unstable period larger boards lead to higher levels of earnings management (β6 = 
0.004, p < 0.01; in equation 3). One possible explanation is that in a recession directors of 
large boards may focus their attention on the strategic board role to solve poor performance 
and present better company results in order to maintain their positions – meanwhile 
overlooking other important responsability such as monitoring managerial opportunism.  
Hypothesis 3c is supported by the results and these indicate that the effect of the frequency 
of meetings on earnings management is negative and significant (β7 = -0.001, p < 0.05; in 
equation 3) and does not show significative differences due to the introduction of a 
recession period in the analysis. The results show that frequent board meetings actively 
monitor managerial behaviour.  
 
4.3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The robustness of the results has been investigated using different models. Prior studies 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Vafeas, 1999) suggest that 
the effects of board composition, board size, and board activity on corporate economic 
variables present a trade-off between advantages and disadvantages. De Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) suggest that this trade-off could show up a nonlinear relationship among 
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the variables. Therefore, these potential nonlinear relationships – including the square of 
the board variables – have been considered on the models. The results are reported in 
columns (b), (c) and (d) of Tables 2, 3 and 4. It is observed that the coefficients of the new 
variables are not statistically significant, thus the previous models (equations 1-3) are 
supported. 
Additionally, Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the joint statistical significance of the crisis-related 
variables that control the effect of the recession period for each regression. Thus, the results 
support the idea that board effectiveness depends on the economic environment. Focusing 
on the autocorrelation test, the null hypothesis that errors are not second-order serial 
autocorrelations cannot be rejected. Consequently, these results do not reject the validity of 
the empirical study. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
5.1. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
Prior literature has put much emphasis on explaining how board characteristics can affect 
firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 
2009), as well as earnings management (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Klein, 
2002; Xie et al. 2003). However, the regulation initiatives and good corporate governance 
codes, such as the SOX and OCDE principles, have stressed management responsibility for 
establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls in order to avoid excessive risk. In 
this regard, this research also contributes to the existing corporate governance literature by 
examining how corporate risk-taking is theoretically and empirically affected by board 
characteristics. 
Board effectiveness influences multiple corporate variables and at the same time these are 
interrelated. Additionally, the corporation is an open system, dependent on contingencies in 
the external environment (Hillman et al., 2009; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). In this sense, the 
study also analyses the board of directors from an open and dynamic perspective. In 
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particular, the study states that different macroeconomic contexts may affect the nature and 
value of the contribution made by boards of directors to the results of a firm. We believe 
that this study helps establish a new theoretical approach that is much closer to the true 
conduct and real behaviour of boards of directors.  
 
5.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The results have important implications for business practice and public policy, as well as 
adding evidence of the consequences of the last financial crisis on the behaviour of boards 
of directors. For business practice, this study reveals that the environmental conditions call 
for different behaviour from directors to fulfil their responsibilities. After the global 
financial crisis, large boards and board activity have stimulated boards to solve the 
economic problems of firms. In a recession it seems that large boards aim at maintaining 
their posts by focusing attention on the strategic board role, solving problems of poor 
performance. Meanwhile, other important responsabilities such as monitoring managerial 
opportunism are overlooked. However, in all economic contexts, the effect of outside 
directors may lead to worsen performance and limit managerial opportunism. 
For public policy, this study suggests changes in normative and voluntary guidelines for 
improving good practices in the boardroom. This study shows that traditional board 
characteristics considered in international initiatives of good corporate governance do not 
lead to reductions in corporate risk-taking in economic growth period. Hence, it seems 
necessary, that legislation encourages greater diversity in the board, in terms of specific 
individual qualities (skill, experience, educational background), and establishing a risk 
culture to improve the quality of the board’s work. 
Additionally, investors take compliance with the provisions of a corporate code of 
governance as a reference. Therefore, these codes should use other board provisions to 
better reflect an integrated view of the effectiveness of board of directors, as well as 
considering the external context of the firm. However, a full understanding and practical 
evaluation of board effectiveness is a task for future research.  
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5.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As in any empirical study, the findings presented are subject to some limitations that open 
new areas for future research. Firstly, the dependent variables – corporate performance, 
corporate risk-taking and corporate earnings – are proxies for the output of board 
effectiveness, i.e. they measure the quality of decision-making and monitoring 
responsabilities developed by the board. However, although board effectiveness is a key 
issue for the success of the corporation, there are other factors that can affect corporate 
variables, such as know-how and technology. Future studies should use more fine-grained 
measurements of board effectiveness, both for group and individual assessments of 
performance.  
Secondly, the corporate governance codes providing recommendations for structural 
elements of boards (Payne et al. 2009), however, one stream of the literature (Minichilli et 
al., 2009; Payne et al. 2009; Roberts et al. 2005) emphasises other predictors (such as skills, 
experience, or background diversity) that better describe efforts by the directors. An 
important line of future research is to examine in more detail the individual directors and 
board characteristics and how these characteristics can help boards fulfil their tasks 
successfully, as well as analysing relationships on specialised committees.  
Finally, the empirical study is confined to the most recent expansion period (2002-2007) 
and the most recent recession (2008). Larger samples of business cycle are clearly needed 
to test the robustness of the results. Future research is encouraged on how the most recent 
financial crisis may influence board behaviour in order to improve the current corporate 
results. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In the context of the recent financial crisis, the interest of academics and practitioners in 
understanding how macroeconomic factors can affect the behaviour of directors when 
fulfilling their responsibilities has resurged. The main purpose of this study is to analyse the 
changes caused by the recent global financial crisis on the influence of board characteristics 
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on corporate results, in terms of corporate performance, corporate risk-taking, and earnings 
management.  
Using the firms listed on the S&P 500 index over the period 2002-2008, the hypotheses 
proposed have been empirically tested. In terms of methodology, the Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system GMM estimator has been used to 
address the potential unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity.  
The main results reveal that during economic growth period, high percentages of outside 
directors and frequency of board meetings may lead to a trade-off in the board roles – 
strategic and monitoring -, worsening corporate performance and limiting the discretional 
behaviour of executives. However, after the global financial crisis, boards became more 
active in solving the economic problems of firms, and in large boards the trade-off is in the 
opposite direction than in economic growth period. During the recession it seems that large 
boards focus their attention on their strategic role, and aim to solve poor performance in 
order to maintain the position of the directors. At the same time, these directors may 
overlook other important responsabilities such as monitoring managerial opportunism. 
Focusing on corporate risk-taking, the findings cannot support that large boards and high 
frequency of meetings do not lead to reduce corporate risk-taking, however, in the 
recession period a high percentage of outside directors seems to lead to lower levels of 
corporate risk taking as compared with an expansion period. Thus, outside directors seem 
to be providers of timely information that helps executives be more sensitive to regulatory 
compliance and so seek to avoid any default by acting conservatively and prudently.  
In conclusion, this longitudinal study offers insights about how the changes in context due 
to the most recent global financial crisis may influence the value of contributions by board 
of directors on corporate results. This study opens a broad range of interesting research 
questions regarding the effectiveness of boards of directors before and after a financial 
crisis. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
PROXY  
(VARAIABLE) 
Obs. Mean S.D. 25th P. 50th P. 75th P. Skw. Kurt. 
EBEIAT/A 
(PERFORMANCE) 
3448 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.10 -10.42 231.41 
ABSOLUTE % VALUE OF 
DISCRETIONARY 
(EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT) 
2836 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.05 5.94 58.32 
S.D. STOCK RETURN  
(RISK) 
3049 0.28 0.10 0.20 0.25 0.33 1.21 4.46 
BOARD SIZE 
(BOARD SIZE) 
2663 10.83 2.45 9.00 11.00 12.00 0.84 6.22 
% OUTISDE DIRECTORS 
(OUTISDER) 
2651 0.81 0.10 0.75 0.83 0.90 -1.12 4.23 
NUMBER BOARD 
MEETINGS 
(BOARD MEETINGS) 
2663 8.27 3.58 6.00 7.00 10.00 2.47 15.38 
MARKET TO BOOK 
VALUE 
(GROWTH) 
3369 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.04 5.80 407.11 
DEBT/A 
(LEVERAGE) 
3441 0.24 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.35 2.44 32.08 
LN(TOTAL ASSET) 
(SIZE) 
3448 9.19 1.46 8.12 9.08 10.12 0.47 3.75 
CHAIR DUALITY 
DUMMY 
(CHAIR DUALITY) 
3346 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.57 1.33 
NUMBER OWNERS 5% 
(OWNERSHIP) 
3232 4.42 2.98 2.00 4.00 6.00 1.05 5.00 
LN (SALES) 
(SALES) 
3467 8.70 1.36 7.80 8.69 9.55 -0.37 5.70 
CASH EARNINGS NET/A 
(FREE CASH FLOW) 
3425 0.17 1.96 0.00 0.04 0.10 9.46 325.31 
VOLUMEN 
SHARES/NUMBER 
SHARES 
(FREQUENCY OF 
TRADING) 
3197 95812 169059 33278 57344 100964 9.30 127.70 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the data included in the unbalanced panel. We calculate all values from the firms 
listed in S&P 500 Index from 2002 to 2008. Source: Thompson One Baker database and Spencer Stuart Board Index. 
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Table 2.Determinants of Corporate Performance (equation 1) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  CORPORATE PERFORMANCE EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT -0.52707*** -0.52858*** -0.52865*** -0.52299*** -0.53554*** 
 (0.10511) (0.10464) (0.10528) (0.10480) (0.10858) 
RISK -0.00030 -0.00032 -0.00035 -0.00036 -0.00040 
 (0.00055) (0.00055) (0.00055) (0.00053) (0.00054) 
OUTSIDER  -0.06178* 0.07647 -0.06047* -0.05937† -0.06560* 
 (0.02950) (0.22447) (0.02948) (0.03037) (0.02846) 
OUTSIDER2  -0.08774    
  (0.14445)    
OUTSIDER *CRISIS     -0.00700 
     (0.04035) 
BOARD SIZE -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00179 -0.00004 -0.00062 
 (0.00120) (0.00120) (0.00812) (0.00120) (0.00127) 
BOARD SIZE 2   0.00007   
   (0.0035)   
BOARD SIZE *CRISIS     0.00614** 
     (0.00202) 
BOARD MEETINGS  -0.00135** -0.00135** -0.00132** -0.00250† -0.00164** 
 (0.00050) (0.00050) (0.00051) (0.00132) (0.00048) 
BOARD MEETINGS2    0.00004  
    (0.00005)  
BOARD MEETINGS *CRISIS     0.00178* 
     (0.00090) 
PERFORMANCE (t-1) 0.12285*** 0.12296*** 0.12261*** 0.12181*** 0.12167*** 
 (0.02548) (0.02530) (0.02568) (0.02520) (0.02433) 
SALES 0.02962* 0.02973* 0.02896* 0.02880* 0.02648* 
 (0.01354) (0.01345) (0.01351) (0.01336) (0.01247) 
MTB 0.00026† 0.00026† 0.00027† 0.00027† 0.00025† 
 (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00014) 
LEVERAGE -0.00074** -0.00074** -0.00072** -0.00074** -0.00069** 
 (0.00025) (0.00025) (0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00023) 
SIZE -0.03561** -0.03560** -0.03547** -0.03453** -0.03330** 
 (0.01188) (0.01181) (0.01180) (0.01200) (0.01122) 
DUAL CHAIR -0.00285 -0.00272 -0.00267 -0.00264 -0.00203 
 (0.00198) (0.00199) (0.00197) (0.00197) (0.00203) 
OWNERSHIP 0.00015 0.00016 0.00014 0.00017 0.00019 
 (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00034) 
CONSTANT 0.21677** 0.16231 0.23082** 0.21935** 0.23623** 
 (0.07472) (0.11536) (0.07808) (0.07504) (0.07007) 
Year Dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
X2- statistics 265.29*** 269.02*** 265.89*** 270.15*** 299.62*** 
X2- statistics year dummies   20.50**   20.69***   20.43**   20.17**   21.85*** 
X2- statistics crisis-related variables       11.09* 
AR1   -4.29***   -4.29***   -4.30***   -4.28***   -4.34*** 
AR2    0.10     0.09    0.12    0.01    0.13 
  N. obs.   1768   1768   1768   1768   1768 
The table reports regression results of corporate performance using the two-step GMM system estimator. Standard errors with the 
robust adjustment proposed by Windmeijer (2005) are in brackets. † p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.Determinants of Corporate Risk-taking (equation 2) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CORPORATE RISK-TAKING EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
PERFORMANCE -3.15552* -3.14031* -3.19293* -3.11708* -3.44730* 
 (1.26267) (1.26383) (1.27402) (1.25180) (1.35321) 
OUTSIDER  1.91115* -1.52610 1.73545† 1.91947* 1.83794* 
 (0.92989) (7.00718) (0.92831) (0.93489) (0.90520) 
OUTSIDER2  2.21679    
  (4.54897)    
OUTSIDER *CRISIS     -2.59503† 
     (0.90520) 
BOARD SIZE -0.00870 -0.00846 0.42718 -0.00932 -0.01419 
 (0.04174) (0.04181) (0.26036) (0.04221) (0.04044) 
BOARD SIZE 2   -0.01859†   
   (0.01114)   
BOARD SIZE *CRISIS     0.07847 
     (0.07982) 
BOARD MEETINGS  0.05281* 0.05303* 0.05312* 0.07718† 0.02431 
 (0.02283) (0.02285) (0.02325) (0.04160) (0.01963) 
BOARD MEETINGS2    -0.00099  
    (0.00132)  
BOARD MEETINGS *CRISIS     0.15262** 
     (0.05026) 
RISK (t-1) 0.88184*** 0.88230*** 0.88144*** 0.88144*** 0.88506*** 
 (0.01434) (0.01451) (0.01448) (0.01448) (0.01397) 
FREQUENCY TRADING 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00001** 0.00001*** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
MTB -0.00244 -0.00247 -0.00265 -0.00238 -0.00249 
 (0.00197) (0.00198) (0.00203) (0.00198) (0.00206) 
LEVERAGE 0.01271 0.01277 0.00939 0.01234 0.01249 
 (0.00797) (0.00794) (0.00769) (0.00800) (0.00766) 
SIZE -0.01887 -0.01573 -0.08770 -0.02475 0.05561 
 (0.23258) (0.23308) (0.23893) (0.23601) (0.21958) 
DUAL CHAIR 0.04899 0.04612 0.04189 0.04603 0.07029 
 (0.07681) (0.07710) (0.07626) (0.07654) (0.07682) 
OWNERSHIP 0.01155 0.01177 0.01176 0.01121 0.01064 
 (0.01067) (0.01075) (0.01060) (0.01049) (0.01079) 
CONSTANT 1.57640 2.83446 0.00852 1.53789 1.14046 
 (2.42383) (3.64249) (2.64022) (2.45996) (2.34389) 
Year Dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
X2- statistics 8955.39*** 8919.77*** 8916.78*** 8953.39*** 8741.17*** 
X2- statistics year dummies   538.54***   536.05***   532.61***   533.63***   104.63*** 
X2- statistics crisis-related variables         13.81** 
AR1    -5.39***    -5.39***    -5.44***    -5.36***    -5.43*** 
AR2    -0.31    -0.32    -0.26    -0.31    -0.36 
  N. obs.    2230    2230    2230    2230    2230 
The table reports regression results of corporate risk-taking using the two-step GMM system estimator. Standard errors with the robust 
adjustment proposed by Windmeijer (2005) are in brackets. † p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 4.Determinants of Earnings Management (equation 3) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
PERFORMANCE -0.49189*** -0.49162*** -0.49117*** -0.49003*** -0.49712*** 
 (0.06503) (0.06466) (0.06487) (0.06423) (0.06628) 
RISK 0.00025 0.00025 0.00022 0.00023 0.00017 
 (0.00041) (0.00041) (0.00042) (0.00041) (0.00040) 
OUTSIDER  -0.04131 -0.01244 -0.03977 -0.03960 -0.05754† 
 (0.03015) (0.24549) (0.03070) (0.02891) (0.03462) 
OUTSIDER2  -0.01822    
  (0.15246)    
OUTSIDER *CRISIS     0.03977 
     (0.03327) 
BOARD SIZE -0.00079 -0.00079 -0.00119 -0.00067 -0.00114 
 (0.00088) (0.00088) (0.00816) (0.00087) (0.00098) 
BOARD SIZE 2   0.00002   
   (0.00036)   
BOARD SIZE *CRISIS     0.00385** 
     (0.00145) 
BOARD MEETINGS  -0.00099† -0.00098† -0.00100† 0.00098 -0.00112* 
 (0.00059) (0.00059) (0.00059) (0.00102) (0.00052) 
BOARD MEETINGS2    -0.00008†  
    (0.00004)  
BOARD MEETINGS *CRISIS     0.00126 
     (0.00091) 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT (t-1) 0.02808 0.02793 0.02850 0.02810 0.03004 
 (0.02548) (0.03466) (0.03478) (0.03512) (0.03456) 
FREE CASH FLOW -0.00175* -0.00175* -0.00174* -0.00181* -0.00180* 
 (0.00076) (0.00076) (0.00077) (0.00077) (0.00082) 
MTB 0.00007† 0.00007† 0.00008† 0.00008† 0.00008* 
 (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
LEVERAGE -0.00035* -0.00035* -0.00035* -0.00037* -0.00029† 
 (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00016) 
SIZE -0.00651 -0.00639 -0.00660 -0.00712 -0.00774 
 (0.00902) (0.00914) (0.00921) (0.00861) (0.01029) 
DUAL CHAIR -0.00019 -0.00020 -0.00014 -0.00023 -0.00022 
 (0.00137) (0.00138) (0.00137) (0.00137) (0.00153) 
OWNERSHIP 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00014 0.00012 
 (0.00032) (0.00031) (0.00032) (0.00033) (0.00029) 
CONSTANT 0.16995* 0.15784 0.17257† 0.16388* 0.20013* 
 (0.07520) (0.12650) (0.10232) (0.07492) (0.08145) 
Year Dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
X2- statistics 204.19*** 210.82*** 201.94*** 211.46*** 229.11*** 
X2- statistics year dummies     6.12     5.99     5.85     6.00   16.39** 
X2- statistics crisis-related variables       11.17* 
AR1    -3.00**    -3.00**    -3.01**    -2.97**    -3.03** 
AR2    -0.95    -0.95    -0.95    -0.64    -0.95 
  N. obs.    1759    1759    1759    1759    1759 
The table reports regression results of earnings management using the two-step GMM system estimator. Standard errors with the robust 
adjustment proposed by Windmeijer (2005) are in brackets. † p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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